Abstract. For many a natural deduction style logic there is a Hilbert-style logic that is equivalent to it in that it has the same theorems (i.e. valid judgements Γ ⊢ P where Γ = ∅). For intuitionistic implicational logic, the axioms of the equivalent Hilbert-style logic can be propositions which are also known as the types of the combinators I, K and S.
Introduction
Most early logical systems (for propositional and predicate logic) allowed no hypotheses and so had no rules for introducing or cancelling them. These could be represented by a finite set of axiom schemes and rules of inference such as modus ponens and generalisation.
Later natural deduction systems which did allow hypotheses had fewer axiom schemes but required introduction and elimination rules for hypotheses. Herbrand showed that classical Hilbert style and natural deduction style propositional and predicate logics had the same theorems (i.e. judgements with empty contexts).
Pure Type Systems
Each Pure Type System (PTS) λX has a set of variables V , a set of constants C, a set of "sorts" S ⊆ C. It has a class of pseudoterms given by T = V | C | (ΠV : T .T ) | (λV : T .T ) | T T . If M and N are pseudoterms, M : A is a statement, Γ is a context if it is a sequence of statements; Γ ⊢ M : A is then called a judgement. A PTS has a set of axioms A each of the form c : s where c ∈ C and s ∈ S. Then it has a set R of triples (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ∈ S 3 , which determine under what conditions a term Πx:A.B is in a sort. Most PTSs are known by a "specification" (S, A, R) (as usually C = S).
The PTS postulates are as follows: When there are two judgements as premises in a rule, we call the left one the major premise and the right one the minor premise. Later we will need the following definition:
Definition 1.1 (Inhabited and Normal Form Inhabited Sorts).
s is an inhabited sort (s ∈ I) if ⊢ A : s for some A. s is a normal form inhabited sort (s ∈ N ) if for some term A in normal form, ⊢ A : s.
The translation [ ] of Bunder and Dekkers [3] translates the pseudoterms and statements of PTSs into terms of illative combinatory logic (ICL) as follows: ∈ F V (XY )) where G = λxyz.Ξx(Syz) (S is the combinator equivalent to λxyz.xz(yz)). Terms in ICL can be represented without any free variables at all using the combinators S and K (equivalent to λxy.x). Ξxy represents roughly (∀u ∈ x)y(u) or x ⊆ y.
ICL, designed as a foundation for logic and mathematics, has a rule like (abstraction) which was derived in Bunder [2] from a set of axioms. In Section 6 we will see how the methods developed there lead to the ones used here. The main difference between PTSs and standard ICLs, other than the lack of distinction between terms and types, lies in the (abstraction) rule. The direct counterpart to the ICL rule would have Γ ⊢ A : s, for Γ ⊢ (Πx:A.B) : s. This is the most important factor in making it difficult to have equivalent Hilbert-style PTSs.
Hilbert-style PTSs
We define Hilbert-style PTSs as follows: Definition 2.1 (HPTS). Each Hilbert style Pure Type System (HPTS) has V , C, S, T , statements, contexts and judgements as for PTSs, except that the contexts are always empty. A HPTS has a set of sorts S and a set of axioms A, as for PTSs, and an additional finite set B of axiom schemes in which "sort variables" can be replaced by sorts. Most HPTSs are known by a "specification" (S, A, B) (as usually C = S). A HPTS has the PTS (application) and (conversion) rules (with empty contexts) as well as:
(subject reduction)
Note the latter rules are derivable for all PTSs, for HPTSs neither is, even using (conversion).
Definition 2.2 (Equivalent HPTS)
. If λX is a PTS with specification (S, A,R), a HPTS λX h , with specification (S, A, B) will be equivalent if
Here ⊢ X stands for provability in λX and ⊢ X h in λX h . If the PTS is arbitrary or obvious from the context we use ⊢ and ⊢ h . B will a function of R, i. Below are some PTSs that have been studied in the literature (particularly Barendregt [1] and Geuvers [4] ).
In λ τ , S = { * }, C = { * , 0}, in all other cases C = S consists of all the constants visible in A and R. (s 1 , s 2 ) is used as an abbreviation for (s 1 , s 2 , s 2 ).
The PTS used in the proof assistant Coq we will call λCoq. It has as axioms:
More axioms are generated by
In early versions R is given by
for all i, j ∈ IN . Coq 8.0 replaces ( i , * s ) ∈ R by ( i , * s , i ) ∈ R.
We will be able to determine whether or not there are equivalent HPTSs for all of the above.
Some PTS Lemmas and Definitions
We now state a number of standard lemmas for PTSs. Most proofs can be found in Barendregt [1] or Bunder and Dekkers [3] .
In each case the derivations, of the judgements of the form Γ ⊢ R : E in (iii) to (v), are shorter than that of Γ ⊢ M : B. 
PTSs where A is the Set of Theorems
The following lemma specifies a set of PTSs whose axioms are its only theorems. The equivalent HPTS is then trivially one with no extra axioms, i.e. with B = ∅.
Lemma 4.1. In a PTS satisfying This implies the following theorem and corollary. 
PTSs with no Equivalent HPTS
In λ → and λP there is no term A such that ⊢ A : * and the only theorem is ⊢ * : . We can show, by a single (product) rule preceeded by two uses of an axiom and a (start) or (weakening) rule, that in the other PTSs, given in Section 2, there are theorems that are not axioms. Most of these are given below. We now give a condition under which, in a PTS, certain sorts have an infinite number of inhabitants of the form Πx:A.B that are not substitution instances of each other. We show later that many PTSs with this property cannot be equivalent to HPTSs.
Lemma 5.2. Assume that in a PTS there is a finite sequence s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ∈ S such that: Proof. Assume that we have ($s 1 , . . . , s n ) for s 1 , s 2 , · · · ∈ S.
As s 1 ∈ N we have, for some A 1 , in normal form
Now we show, by induction on i that, for 1 < i ≤ n, there is a B i−1 and an
When i = 2 we have ⊢ A 1 : s 1 above, otherwise we have ⊢ A i−1 : s i−1 by the induction hypothesis. By (weakening) we have
and by (product) we have (5.1). So (5.1) holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and, as we have
Repeating the above, with A n for A 1 , we get ⊢ A 2n−1 : s 1 and similarly
and so A in−i = β A jn−j and eventually
But A 1 is a proper part of A (j−i)(n−1)+1 and is in normal form, which is impossible. Hence A n , A 2n−1 , A 3n−2 , . . . are β-distinct inhabitants of s all of the form Πx:A.B, which are not substitution instances of each other.
($s 1 , . . . , s n ) is satisfied for many sequences s 1 , s 2 , . . . ., s n and many PTSs. Here we list one such sequence and sort for most of the PTSs given in Section 2.
Lemma 5.3.
(i) λ τ , λ * and λ2 satisfy ($ * , * ).
(ii) λω, λω, λP2, λPω, λC, λU and λHOL satisfy ($ , ).
(iii) λAUT-68, λAUT-QE and λPAL satisfy ($△, △).
Proof.
(i) By Lemma 5.1(i), (ii) with s ′ = * .
(ii) For λP2, by Lemma 5.1(ii), with s ′ = * . For the others with s ′ = .
(iii) By Lemma 5.1(iv) with s ′ = .
Now we can prove the main result in the section.
Theorem 5.4. If, in a PTS λX, ($s 1 , . . . , s n ) holds for some s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ S and
then there is no HPTS equivalent to λX.
Proof. By Lemma 5.2, if ($s 1 , . . . , s n ) holds we have, for an infinite number of β -distinct terms Πx:A.B, which are not substitution instances of each other
Suppose that there is an equivalent λX h . As a HPTS has only a finite set of axioms B, at least some must be derived, in λX h , by (application) and perhaps (conversion), (type reduction) and (subject reduction) from Note that ($$s) is not satisfied by any sort s in λ * and λCoq. For λ → ($$ * ) holds but ($ * , s 2 , . . . , * ) does not for any s 2 , . . . For λP ($$ * ) fails, ($$ ) holds but ($ , s 2 , . . . , ) does not for any s 2 , . . .
How to Prove (abstraction) and (product)
In implicational logic the ⊃-introduction rule is Γ, A ⊢ B ⇒ Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B. The hypothesis A in Γ, A ⊢ B is cancelled in Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B. This rule is proved in a Hilbert-style system by induction on the number of steps in a derivation that allows hypotheses. We assume that an hypothesis can be cancelled in the previous step (or steps) and use this to show it can be cancelled in the next. In intuitionistic and classical implicational logic three cases are needed and each requires the Hilbert-style system to have a particular axiom or theorem.
If the hypothesis p is itself the step in the deduction we need
If the deduction step is an axiom or another hypothesis than p we need
If the deduction step comes by modus ponens from
Note that the three theorems we require represent the simple types of the combinators I, K and S (when ⊃ is replaced by →).
In illative combinatory logic, the introduction rule for Ξ (restricted generality) is Γ,
and Ax is the hypothesis being cancelled. In the proof of this rule in a Hilbert-style system,(see Bunder [2] ), the first two cases are similar to those for the proof of implicational introduction. The third is the case where Γ, Ax ⊢ DM is derived from Γ, Ax ⊢ ΞCD and Γ, Ax ⊢ CM . Again, by induction, we assume that the Ξ-introduction step can be applied to the previous steps.
The axioms of the Hilbert-style system, when rewritten with U → V for F U V ≡ λx.ΞU (λy.V (xy)) are:
where . . . represent conditions involving L on A, B and C.
These are type assignment statements for I, K and S. It might be thought that this same technique could be employed for PTSs, using type assignment statements for I, K and S, of the form ⊢ (. . . I) : (. . . A → A) etc and with hypotheses of the form x : A. This however may not work.
If we have a PTS with (c : s 1 ) ∈ A and can prove x : c ⊢ B : s 2 and/or x : c ⊢ M : B, perhaps with M ≡ x, c ≡ B, it may be that (product) and (abstraction) cannot be applied because (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ∈ R for any s 3 .
This does not mean that x : c can never be cancelled. We may obtain: This PTS therefore does have theorems not in A, but it is hard to determine the HPTS corresponding to it.
Supersorted PTSs
PTSs that have equivalent HPTSs are λ * and λCoq (both versions), but these belong to a larger class that has the following property:
Definition 7.1 (Supersorted). A PTS is said to be supersorted if:
(∀c ∈ C)(∃s ∈ S) (c : s) ∈ A and (∀s 1 , s 2 ∈ S) (∃s 3 ∈ S) (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ∈ R.
For supersorted PTSs (abstraction) can be simplified. If the PTS is supersorted we have, for some s 2 , (s : s 2 ) ∈ A in the latter (B = s) case, and so the result of the former case by Lemma 3.7(i).
Hence by (product) and supersortedness we have, for some s 3 ∈ S, For a supersorted PTS λX we define a corresponding HPTS λX h , which in Theorem 9.4 is shown to be equivalent to λX h . Note. The s 1 , s 2 , . . . . in Axioms I1, K1 and S1 are sort variables that can be replaced by arbitrary elements of S. In the axioms generated by (I) and (II) there are restrictions on the sorts that can be substituted for such variables based on the PTS provability of the judgements mentioned. Given a PTS λX, we will assume below that λX h is the corresponding HPTS.
Theorem 7.4. If, for a supersorted PTS,
⊢ h M : A then ⊢ M : A.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of
A is one of the axioms of A, Π1, I1, K1 or S1, or is generated by (I) or (II), we have ⊢ M : A.
The (application) and (conversion) cases follow from the induction hypothesis. The (subject reduction) and (type reduction) cases follow from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.6. 
(abstraction) and (II) then give the result.
We also need an extension of λX h that allows hypotheses.
Definition 7.6 (λX h+ ). If λX is a PTS, λX h+ has all the postulates of λX h , also with nonempty contexts, and the (start) and (weakening) rules of λX.
Proof. Immediate because in a derivation of ⊢ h+ M : A no (start) or (weakening) rule can be used. No nonempty context can be emptied in λX h+ .
The extra axioms of B generated by (I) we will need in the proof of the Correctness of Types Lemma for λX h+ (if Γ ⊢ h+ M : A then Γ ⊢ h+ A : s for some s).
Those generated by (II) we need in the proof of (abstraction) to show that, if we have Γ ⊢ h+ (Πx:C.D) : s 3 , we also have for (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ∈ R, Γ ⊢ h+ C : s 1 and Γ ⊢ h+ (λx:C.D) : (Πx:C.s 2 ), where the derivation of the latter is no longer than the derivation of Γ ⊢ h+ (Πx:C.D) : s 3 . The "no longer than" is needed for proof by induction to work.
Many of the axioms are, in a sense, superfluous. We can for example, prove axioms Π4, Π8 and Π11 (below) from Axiom K1 and Axiom Π5 from Axioms Π1 and Π4. However, using fewer axioms can mean that the derivation of a Γ ⊢ h+ (λx:C.D) : (Πx:C.s 2 ) is longer than that of Γ ⊢ h+ (Πx:C.D) : s 3 .
To illustrate that the axioms, generated by (I) and (II) above, form finite sets, we list all the ones generated by Axiom Π1(s ′ i below is such that (s i : ]. The axiom required by (I) for Π1, Π8 and Π10 is Π2, for Π3, Π4 and Π9, Π5, for Π11, Π7 and for Π6 the instance of Π7 where s 2 = s 3 . The axiom required by (II) for Π1 is Π6, for Π2 is Π3, for Π3 is Π8, for Π5 is Π4, for Π7 is Π9, for Π9 is Π10 and for Π10 is Π11.
Each axiom is an axiom scheme in the sense that it is an axiom for all s 1 , s 2 , . . . for which it is provable in λX. Thus most axioms (not Π6) have some restrictions, other than
. Some of these restrictions will appear in (the proofs of) some of the lemmas for λX h+ below.
We will show later that in λX h+ , for a suitable λX, (product) and (abstraction) are admissible and that the theorems of λX h+ are exactly those of λX h and λX.
The Correctness of Types Lemmas for λX h+
To state and prove some preliminary lemmas we need some definitions.
Definition 8.1 (major premise chain). A major premise chain (mpc) in a derivation is a sequence of judgements starting with one formed by a (start) rule or an axiom. The remaining judgements of the chain are obtained by (weakening), (application) or (conversion), with the previous judgement as major premise, or by (subject reduction) or (type reduction). The minor premises in (weakening), (application) and (conversion) rules for which the major premises are in an mpc, will be called the minor premises attached to the mpc.
The final judgement of an mpc that is not a proper part of a larger mpc, must be the final judgement in a derivation, a judgement that is the premise for a (start) rule or the minor premise in a (weakening), (application) or (conversion) rule.
Any derivation is therefore made up of linked mpcs. where n > 0, N is one of x 1 , . . . , x n or is formed by application from (some of) x 1 , . . . , x n and the mpc has at least n (application) steps and (subject reduction) steps that reduce all of the n λx i redexes. An mpc is short otherwise. A derivation is short if it has no long mpcs and long otherwise.
Definition 8.3 (Application Length -alength). The application length or alength of a derivation is its number of (application) steps, where steps in identical minor premises in the derivation, are counted only once. A derivation of lesser alength than another will be called ashorter, one of greater alength alonger.
Note. One derivation of a judgement may be shorter (in length) than another without being short.
Lemma 8.4. If the final mpc in a derivation of
is long, it starts with an axiom of the form (8.1) and the (subject reduction) step that reduces the λx n redex comes directly after the nth (application) step, then that derivation of (8.2) can be replaced by an ashorter one.
Proof. This has to be proved for each of the axioms of B that is of this form. We will prove it for Axiom S8, below, the proofs for other axioms are similar. Let the minor premises in the six (application) steps involving Πy 1 to Πy 6 in the long derivation of (8.2) be, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6:
. Note that as contexts can only grow, each Γ i for 1 ≤ i < 6 is an initial segment of Γ i+1 Now by (weakening), (subject reduction), (type reduction) and just three (application) steps we get from three of these minor premises:
and so
We now have a new derivation of (8.2), which, given that any (application)s in the two uses of Γ 6 ⊢ Y 6 : E 6 are counted only once, has fewer (application)s, and so is ashorter than, the old derivation of (8.2).
Lemma 8.5 (Shortness Lemma for HPTS + ). Every valid judgement in a HPTS + has a short derivation.
Proof. We prove this by showing that for every long derivation there is an ashorter derivation of the same judgement.
Assume that the following is the part of a long mpc, in a long derivation, up to the λx n reduction, together with the minor premises used in the n (application) steps.
. . .
Here ⊢ h+ T 1 : Πx 1 :B 0 .C 0 is an axiom of the form (8.1) with N made up of (some of)
The first, second and nth of the n or more (application)s and the (subject reduction) contracting the λx n redex are explicitly shown. The steps after the nth (application) only alter T n by reducing it, so steps can be permuted so that the λx n reduction takes place straight after the nth (application) step as follows:
This new derivation is no alonger than the original, but the part up to Γ n ⊢ h+ N ′ [x n := X ′ n ] : C n [x n := X n ] is long and can be replaced, by Lemma 8. 4 , by an ashorter derivation, so the whole derivation becomes ashorter. (If the derivation had identical mpcs to the above, which were all minor premises in the same mpc, all would have to be altered as above to ensure that the new derivation is not alonger than the old.)
In the remaining lemmas and theorems we use a different measure of length of a derivation, where "similar" subderivations are counted only once.
Definition 8.6 (Similar). Two derivations are said to be similar if they are identical or one, in its final mpc, starts with an axiom of B of the form (8.1), and the other differs only in that its final mpc starts with an axiom of B generated from the other by one or more applications of (II).
We now define:
Definition 8.7 (Similarity Length -slength). The similarity length (or slength) of a derivation is given by:
(i) the number of (application) steps, (ii) the number of (conversion), (start) and (weakening) steps. Similar derivations ending in the two premises of a (weakening) step, are counted only once.
A derivation of lesser slength than another will be said to be sshorter and one of greater slength as slonger.
Lemma 8.8. Given, for s ′ ∈ S, a short derivation of:
there is, for some s ∈ S, a derivation, no longer or slonger than that of (8. Proof. Consider the first judgement in the final mpc in a short derivation of (8.3). This cannot be an axiom of A or be formed by a (start) rule, so it is an axiom of B of the form (8.1), where N ≡ Πx:B ′ .C ′ and A n+1 ≡ s ′ . If in this mpc we replace this axiom by the one generated from it by (II), then using exactly the same steps and minor premises we obtain a derivation of (8.4) of the same length.
In this final mpc there are no (weakening) steps in which the premises are similar, until perhaps after the last (application) step, as, until then, no type can be in S. If, at that stage, (8.3) is formed by one or more (weakening) steps (and perhaps (subject reduction)) from Γ − ⊢ h+ Πx:B 0 .C 0 : s ′ and similar minor premises such as Γ − ⊢ h+ D : s ′ , these are counted only once each in the slength. In the derivation obtained by changing the axiom, the above derivations remain similar and so the slength of the derivation remains the same. where M ≡ x and Γ ≡ Γ − , x : A, (8.6) comes from two copies of (8.7) and (weakening). The two derivations of (8.7) are counted only once, so this derivation of (8.6) is no slonger than that of (8.5). If (8.5) is an axiom we have (8.6) by (I) or by supersortedness. We now assume k ≥ 2. If (8.5) comes from Γ ′ ⊢ h+ M : A and Γ ′ ⊢ h+ B : s ′ , by (weakening), where s ′ ∈ S, A ∈ S and Γ = Γ ′ , x : B, these derivations are both counted in the slength of the derivation of (8.5). We have, by the induction hypothesis, Γ ′ ⊢ h+ A : s, by a derivation no slonger than that of Γ ′ ⊢ h+ M : A, for some s ∈ S and we obtain (8.6) by (weakening), by a derivation that is no slonger than that of (8.5).
If (8.5) comes from Γ ⊢ h+ N : A, by (subject reduction), we have (8.6) by a derivation no slonger than that of (8.5).
If (8.5) comes from Γ ⊢ h+ M : B, by (type reduction), we have Γ ⊢ h+ B : s by the induction hypothesis and (8.6) by (subject reduction), by a derivation no slonger than that of (8.5).
If (8.5) comes from Γ ⊢ h+ M : B, by (conversion), we have (8.6) by a derivation sshorter than that of (8.5).
If (8.5) comes from Γ ⊢ h+ P : Πx:B.C and Γ ⊢ h+ Q : B, where M ≡ P Q and A ≡ C[x := Q], by (application), we have by the induction hypothesis, Γ ⊢ h+ Πx:B.C : s ′ for some s ′ ∈ S, by a derivation no slonger than that of Γ ⊢ h+ P : Πx:B.C. Then by Lemma 8.8 we have Γ ⊢ h+ λx:B.C : Πx:B.s, for some s ∈ S by a derivation no slonger than that of Γ ⊢ h+ P : Πx:B.C. Then by (application) using Γ ⊢ h+ Q : B we have (8.6) by a derivation no slonger than that of (8.5).
Lemma 8.10 (Start Lemma for HPTS
Proof. By an easy induction on the derivation of (8.8).
9. The Equivalence Results 
By the induction hypothesis and (subject reduction) we have: hence by (9.3) and (conversion) we have (9.2). Case 4 (9.1) comes by (application) (and reduction) from Γ, x : A ⊢ h+ P : (Πy:C.D) (9.4) and Γ, x : A ⊢ h+ Q : C (9.5) where
By the Correctness of Types lemma we have for some s 4 ∈ S, by a derivation no slonger than that of (9.4):
Γ, x : A ⊢ h+ (Πy:C.D) : s 4 (9.6) now by Lemma 8.8 we have for some s 3 ∈ S, by a derivation no slonger than that of (9.4), and so sshorter than that of (9. now by Axiom S1, Γ ⊢ h+ A : s 1 , (obtained as in Case 3) (9.11), (9.10), (9.8), (9.9) and five (application)s, (subject reduction) and (type reduction) give (9.2). (Note that in Axiom S1 s 1 , s 2 and s 3 (here s 1 , s 5 and s 2 ) can be arbitrarily chosen in a supersorted PTS). Lemmas 9.1 and 9.2 show that a theorem that can be proved in λX h+ , using hypotheses, (abstraction) and (product), can also be proved in λX h . So: Theorem 9.3. If λX is supersorted it is equivalent to λX h+ in that they have the same valid judgements.
Proof. By Theorem 7.4, λX h is a subsystem of λX. The additional rules of λX h+ are rules of λX, so λX h+ is a subsystem of λX. The extra rules of λX have been shown to be admissible in λX h+ in Lemmas 9.1 and 9.2, so λX h+ and λX have the same valid judgements.
Theorem 9.4. If λX is supersorted λX and λX h are equivalent in that they have the same theorems.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 9.3 that λX and λX h+ have the same valid judgements with empty contexts i.e. theorems and so by Lemma 7.7 that λX and λX h have the same theorems.
Axioms I, K, S and Π as Types
Axioms I1, K1 and S1 can be rewritten in terms of type free combinators (allowing η-reduction) as: 11. Identifying λ and Π In the de Bruijn AUTOMATH systems Π and λ are usually identified. Kameraddine has studied the effect of allowing β-reductions in the (former) Π terms in [5] . Doing this Axiom I1 becomes:
⊢ KI : (λx:s 1 . λy:x . x) and similarly for the other axioms. If we write the type in terms of combinators we can get (depending on the algorithm) ⊢ KI : S(KK)I or ⊢ KI : K.
